10:42 Modern control system | |
| Hello! After reading an interesting article, I wanted to share his knowledge and thoughts on the modern control system. Described below relate more to the production companies such as Yokogawa, Siemens and Honeywell. Just want to say that each system has its own characteristics, advantages and disadvantages, so I summarize only the general characteristics of modern process control system. Modern automated process control systems (ACS) used in hazardous occupations and enterprises (chemical, petrochemical industry, hydropower, thermal power plants, nuclear power plants, etc.), as a rule, consist of a distributed control system (DCS) and the emergency system of automatic protection (PAZ). DCSRSU is a software-hardware system, consisting of the following elements:
PAZThe main objective of PAZ - outsourcing to a safe state in case of any problems with the DCS (yield process for the established boundaries, equipment failure, emergency situations). Typically, ESD system receives data from redundant sensors (one of the most reliable schemes considered "2oo3" when the operation of any 2 of the 3 sensors on a single control point, is considered a prerequisite for the operation of the Lock) and manages the redundant equipment. The system PAZ no operator stations, there is only an engineering station, through which the configuration of the PLC system PAZ. From stations in the DCS operator can see how the system works PAZ, but you can not manage it. End user equipment does not depend on the equipment CSF, for example, if a pipeline valve jammed CSF, then run for safety valve ESD system. Features APCSNow I would like to note the important features of modern process control system:
ConclusionsThus, the contamination of the operator station the virus is unlikely, but even if it does, then there is no obvious security threat is not represented. Of course, there are instances when operators manage to circumvent the ban and establish its station games and get online, but it is quickly suppressed by deprivation of premiums and other administrative methods. If we assume that there is a special virus that knows the peculiarities of systems, and could hypothetically manage workflow, causing negative consequences in any case, in case of emergency run for ESD system (which is not controlled by station operators) and transfer production in a safe condition. Yes, it will be millions of losses to the enterprise (stop output), but in any case not manmade disasters. If we talk about the likelihood of infection engineering station PAZ, that, firstly, must be super intelligent virus that reprograms itself PLC, precisely so that he refused the necessary moment, and secondly, engineers PAZ, must be completely headless and dig a pit themselves. Of course, it's not all the factors that make infection station engineer PAZ unlikely event that I can give you some more: the constant checking software versions loaded in the PLC, the permanent control room with the engineering station, and of course, the password is set on the project itself ESD system. Finally, I want to say that the security of modern process control system, of course, threatened by viruses and other high-tech issues, such as nursing stations of an operator in a banal BSOD, but they are not as critical as many people want to present it. We must remember that the safety monitor ESD system, the configuration of which approach with caution and responsibility. The human factor is always the case, but the ESD system to create and to reduce the negative impact of this factor to a minimum. Happy to answer questions if they arise. UPD. Possible scenario of attack on the SCADA system convincingly described makran, which, by the way, thanks for the invite. Good luck! | |
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